How often is Employee Anger an Insider Risk I? Detecting and Measuring Negative Sentiment versus Insider Risk in Digital Communications by Shaw, Eric et al.
Journal of Digital Forensics, 
Security and Law 
Volume 8 Number 1 Article 3 
2013 
How often is Employee Anger an Insider Risk I? Detecting and 
Measuring Negative Sentiment versus Insider Risk in Digital 
Communications 
Eric Shaw 
Maria Payri 
Michael Cohn 
Ilene R. Shaw 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/jdfsl 
 Part of the Computer Engineering Commons, Computer Law Commons, Electrical and Computer 
Engineering Commons, Forensic Science and Technology Commons, and the Information Security 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Shaw, Eric; Payri, Maria; Cohn, Michael; and Shaw, Ilene R. (2013) "How often is Employee Anger an Insider 
Risk I? Detecting and Measuring Negative Sentiment versus Insider Risk in Digital Communications," 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law: Vol. 8 : No. 1 , Article 3. 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/jdfsl.2013.1140 
Available at: https://commons.erau.edu/jdfsl/vol8/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Journals at Scholarly Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Digital Forensics, 
Security and Law by an authorized administrator of 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please 
contact commons@erau.edu. 
(c)ADFSL 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 8(1) 
 
39 
 
How often is Employee Anger an Insider Risk I? 
Detecting and Measuring Negative Sentiment 
versus Insider Risk in Digital Communications  
 
 Eric Shaw, Ph.D.*   
Suite 514 
5225 Connecticut Ave. NW 
Washington, DC 20015 
eshaw@msn.com 
Maria Payri, M.A. 
Michael Cohn, M.A. 
Ilene R. Shaw, R.N. 
 
*Corresponding Author 
Keywords: Insider Risk, Digital Communication, Disgruntlement, Detecting, 
Negative Sentiment, Threat, Employee Anger, Workplace Violence, Content 
Analysis, Automated Psychological assessment 
ABSTRACT 
This research introduced two new scales for the identification and measurement 
of negative sentiment and insider risk in communications in order to examine 
the unexplored relationship between these two constructs. The inter-rater 
reliability and criterion validity of the Scale of Negativity in Texts (SNIT) and 
the Scale of Insider Risk in Digital Communications (SIRDC) were established 
with a random sample of email from the Enron archive and criterion measures 
from established insiders, disgruntled employees, suicidal, depressed, angry, 
anxious, and other sampled groups. In addition, the sensitivity of the scales to 
changes over time as the risk of digital attack increased and transitioned to a 
physical attack was also examined in an actual case study.  Inter-rater reliability 
for the SNIT was extremely high across groups while the SIRDC produced 
lower, but acceptable levels of agreement. Both measures also significantly 
distinguished the criterion groups from the overall Enron sample. The scales 
were then used to measure the frequency of negative sentiment and insider risk 
indicators in the random Enron sample and the relationship between the two 
constructs. While low levels of negative sentiment were found in 20% of the 
sample, moderate and high levels of negative sentiment were extremely rare, 
occurring in less than 1% of communications. Less than 4% of the sampled 
emails displayed indicators of insider risk on the SIRDC. Emails containing high 
levels of insider risk comprised less than one percent or the sample. Of the emails 
containing negative sentiment in the sample, only 16.3%, also displayed 
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indicators of insider risk. The odds of a communication containing insider risk 
increased with the level of negative sentiment and only low levels of insider risk 
were found at low levels of negative sentiment. All of the emails found to contain 
insider risk indicators on the SIRDC also displayed some level of negative 
sentiment.  The implications of these findings for insider risk detection were then 
examined.   
1. INTRODUCTION 
News reports continually feature insider episodes including acts of workplace 
violence, espionage, sabotage, theft of intellectual property, harassment, 
violations of financial rules and leaks of sensitive information by employees or 
other insiders.  Recent research on the relatively low frequency of organizational 
reporting of many classes of non-violent insider offenses to law enforcement 
indicates that these public cases are only the tip of the insider iceberg (Computer 
Security Institute [2011] 15th Annual Computer Security Institute 2010/2011 
Survey, CSI www.GoCSI.com). Whether public or private, digital 
communications frequently form the core of investigative leads and evidence in 
insider cases. All too often, as in the recent cases of the Boston Marathon 
bombers (The New York Times, 2013), and other dangerous insiders (e.g., 
Pittsburgh gym killer George Sodini [The Telegraph, 2009], accused anthrax 
killer Bruce Ivins [Expert Behavioral Analysis Panel, 2010], etc.),   investigators 
find that the writing was on the virtual wall in terms of the warning signs of 
insider risk discovered.  While there are many available approaches for detecting 
and analyzing technical anomalies indicative of insider risks related to theft of 
intellectual property, espionage, leaks, and fraud (unusual copying, use of 
prohibited memory devices, etc.), there are few tools for detecting content 
indicative of insider risk in digital communications. Improved detection and 
assessment of risk indicators in content might facilitate more effective 
investigation, prevention, and management of insider and other problems by 
helping investigators prioritize leads based on technical detection signals and 
assigning priority to individuals who are also disgruntled. In addition, human 
scales that measure risk can serve as a valuable benchmark for computerized risk 
assessment detection approaches.   
Such improvements in online risk detection tools seem particularly important as 
more of our lives have moved from face-to-face and telephonic communication 
to online exchanges. In addition, research on the lack of coworker and supervisor 
reporting of observed risk indicators indicates that security awareness programs 
seeking to increase such reports are facing significant cultural obstacles (Wood 
and Marshall-Mies, 2003).  
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1.1 Negative Sentiment and Insider Risk 
Employee frustration and anger have long been associated with aggression and 
violence in the workplace (Glomb and Liao, 2003; Hershcovis et al., 2007; 
Hershcovis and Barling, 2010), as well as turnover, absenteeism, accidents on 
the job, alcohol consumption, and other high-risk health behaviors (O’Neil et. 
al. 2009).  Holton (2009) also found an association between anger and fraud, and 
Band and colleagues (Band et al., 2006) found similar links to sabotage and 
espionage. Occupational health researchers who study a range of counter-
productive work behaviors (CWBs), from taking long lunches to workplace 
violence, have consistently found a strong link between negative emotions and 
CWBs (Brief and Weiss, 2002; Dalal, 2005; Sakurai and Jex, 2012; Schat and 
Kelloway, 2005).  
However, not all forms of anger or negative sentiment pose a risk of such 
counter-productive behavior. For example, Averill (1983) estimated that only 
around 10% of incidents involving anger result in aggressive or violent 
outcomes.  Occupational health researchers surveying large groups of employees 
for the presence and frequency of CWBs routinely note such contributing factors 
as individual baseline anger (trait negative affectivity), job type, and job 
autonomy, all of which can contribute to negative sentiment without increasing 
the risk of CWBs. In addition, occupational health researchers have found that 
other factors, such as social and supervisor support, can mediate the link between 
negative emotions and CWBs (Sakurai and Jex, 2012). These researchers have 
also documented a range of possible employee reactions to negative emotions 
that may substitute for insider acts, including withdrawal, avoidance, regulation 
of negative emotion through diet, smoking, exercise, or leaving the workplace.  
Clearly, an individual’s disposition, job stress, freedom to react to stress, and 
previous experience can set the stage for his reactivity to perceived aversive 
stimuli and modify the likelihood of CWBs. There are also probably few 
organizations where some form of negative sentiment regarding working 
conditions or related issues is not part of the background “noise” in employee 
communications. 
Thus, the use of anger or negative sentiment alone, or the routine use of low 
levels of negative sentiment as an indicator of insider risk or other CWBs may 
result in false positive reports, distracting attention from more serious cases.  
Based on their workplace data, Calhoun and Weston (2008) have argued that 
authors expressing disgruntlement and even threats (so-called “Howlers”) may 
be at much less risk for actual attacks than those who more carefully plan without 
any form of expressed warning (so called “Hunters”).  
There is also a strong ethical and scientific tradition in clinical psychology test 
development of ensuring that clinical measures are highly specific in their ability 
to identify criterion groups of concern, versus false positives. Thus, measures of 
depression, anti-social behavior, or attention deficit disorders should identify at 
Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 8(1) 
 
42 
 
least 80% of persons with these syndromes in clinical samples and differentiate 
them from persons who do not have these disorders. Similarly, effective 
detection tools for insider risk should, theoretically, be able to differentiate 
persons with negative sentiment who do and do not pose a threat of insider 
activity. While we have not yet achieved this level of diagnostic specificity or 
selectivity, the deployment of both a rating scale for negative sentiment and a 
separate scale for insider risk will allow improved investigation of the 
relationship between these two phenomena and help us better understand areas 
of overlap and independence between the constructs. This area is so unexplored 
that we do not know the answer to such basic questions as: (1) What is the 
frequency of communication with negative sentiment or insider risk in a random 
sample of organizational emails? (2) What percentage of digital communications 
with significant negative sentiment also contains insider risk indicators? (3) 
What percentage of messages associated with demonstrated insider risk also 
contain negative sentiment?  (4) Are particular types of negative sentiment more 
likely to be associated with different types of insider risk such as violence, 
espionage, leaks, fraud, or theft of intellectual property?  Without separate rating 
scales for these two phenomena these issues have been difficult to address 
empirically. 
Currently, there are no published, validated, specialized rating scales for the 
detection and measurement of negative sentiment in communications for use by 
analysts of insider risk and investigators of insider violations. While on the 
surface, the detection of negative sentiment may seem a rather straight-forward 
pursuit, there are so many ways in which individuals can express negative 
feelings and judgments without the use of overtly negative terms that the 
detection and rating of negative expressions can actually be quite complicated.  
A validated measurement system for use by analysts and investigators might 
eliminate threats to reliability derived from subjective “expert” or other human 
judgments, buttress the credibility of these judgments with empirical support, 
improve analyst detection rates, sensitize analysts to changes over time that 
might signal increased risk, and help investigators narrow a field of suspects 
according to objectively measured levels of disgruntlement contributing to 
subject motivation. Computerized, content-based risk detection methods may 
always be challenged to detect the many nuanced aspects of human negative 
expression such as sarcasm (“that worked out well”),  irony (“you got as good 
as you gave”) and even non-negative forms of negative expression such as 
protest (“I’ve always done my best for the Company”). Human-based coding 
schemes that capture these more subtle forms of negative emotion will provide 
a critical benchmark for these particularly challenging tasks. Even if the 
proposed scales prove more useful in research than in applied evaluations and 
investigations, familiarity with these measures might still improve analyst and 
investigator sensitivity, as well as coworker reporting.   
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To address some of these gaps in the literature, this paper describes two 
observational scales designed to detect and measure levels of negative sentiment 
and insider risk, respectively, within digital or other content. The derivation of 
these scales, their inter-rater reliability, and their performance with criterion 
groups are presented. Scale results with a random sample of employee 
communications from the Enron archive combined with a random sample of 
established insider communications are also examined to shed light on the 
unexplored relationship between negative sentiment and insider risk in digital 
communications.   
The balance of this paper describes the Scale of Negativity in Text (SNIT) and 
the Scale of Insider Risk in Digital Communication (SIRDC), as well as the 
research design and results obtained from tests of their inter-rater reliability and 
performance with criterion groups. The SNIT and SIRDC results are then 
explored to address the relationship between expressed negative sentiment and 
insider risk.  
2. DETECTING AND MEASURING NEGATIVE SENTIMENT AND 
INSIDER RISK 
2.1 Description of the SNIT and SIRDC 
2.1.1 The Scale for Negativity in Text (SNIT) 
The Scale for Negativity in Text was designed to help researchers and 
investigators detect and score the frequency of negative feelings and attitudes in 
communication. While the SNIT codes straight-forward judgments and feelings 
with negative connotations, it was also designed to detect and score more subtle 
and complex forms of expression communicating negativity. For example, the 
SNIT identifies and codes the frequency of negative judgments and feelings, as 
well as terms that add emphasis or power to these sentiments.  So, in the example 
“I deeply resent your intrusion,”  “resent” would be coded as a negative feeling, 
and “deeply” would be scored as an adverbial intensifier—a term that increases 
the power of the feeling of resentment (Weintraub, 1981, 1989). Other non-
verbal intensifiers may include exclamation marks, underlining, emoticons, or 
other “non-verbal” forms of emphasis. In addition, “your intrusion” would be 
coded as a direct accusation, criticism, or attack against a specific individual or 
group. Other examples of direct negative sentiment scored by the SNIT include 
statements of opposition or negation (“I won’t do that”) (Weintraub, 1981, 
1989), direct and indirect threats, use of curses, foul language or other slurs, 
dehumanizing sexual material, sarcasm, rhetorical questions or negative irony, 
negative religious or ethnic attacks, and provocations or taunts.  
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The SNIT also identifies and scores more subtle and complex expressions of 
negative sentiment, including appeals, pleas, requests, or demands that 
communicate author discomfort without expressing overt negativity. For 
example, the phrase “please listen to me” does not contain any overtly negative 
content but may represent a statement of author discomfort. In addition, the 
SNIT identifies and scores neutral or even positive statements that imply 
negativity, protest, criticism, or opposition without direct expressions of 
negativity.  For example, the statement “she left me” does not include any overtly 
negative material, but the context can indicate author disappointment with the 
event. The phrase “I have always done my best for the Company” also does not 
contain any overtly negative content.  However, given the appropriate context, 
it could be coded by the SNIT as a non-negative statement of protest. Table 1 in 
the Appendix displays these 16 SNIT categories and examples of coded terms 
for each variable.   
As an example from insider communication, the excerpt below was taken from 
Army Private Bradley Manning’s correspondence with a hacker contact during 
the period in which he was accused of leaking classified material to Wikileaks 
(Hansen, 2011). 
i cant believe what im confessing to you :’(ive been so isolated 
so long… i just wanted to be nice, and live a normal life… but 
events kept forcing me to figure out ways to survive… smart 
enough to know whats going on, but helpless to do anything… 
Table 1 identifies examples of terms from this passage that would be coded on 
the SNIT by category.  
2.1.2 The Scale of Insider Risk in Digital Communication (SIRDC) 
The SIRDC contains seven components related to the detection and scoring of 
insider risks, including such insider acts as violence, sabotage, espionage, IP 
theft, and damaging leaks.  These seven components include: 
 Process variables that indicate the extent to which subject behavior that 
could be directly associated with, or contribute to, the accomplishment 
of insider actions is present and/or increasing (preparations, rehearsals, 
etc.); 
 Psychological State variables that indicate the extent that subject 
attitudes, beliefs, and feelings are consistent with individuals who have 
committed insider acts; 
 Personal Predisposition variables that indicate the extent to which the 
subject’s observed history, experiences, personal characteristics, and 
contacts mirror those of previous insider subjects;  
 Personal Stressors; 
 Professional Stressors; 
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 Concerning Behaviors, such as violations of workplace or other rules, 
traditions, laws, policies, or procedures that indicate the extent to which 
the subject has had difficulty controlling his behavior consistent with 
expectations, in a manner similar to other insiders; and 
 Mitigating factors indicating that the subject’s level of insider risk may 
be modified by personal or other characteristics that reduce the level of 
risk. 
Table 1 Examples of Terms and SNIT Code by Category 
SNIT Coding for Bradley 
Manning Passage by Content and 
SNIT Category 
SNIT Category Scored 
Can’t Negation or Opposition Statement 
Confessing Non-Negative negative  
So Adverbial intensifier 
isolated Negative feeling 
So Adverbial intensifier 
long Non-negative Negative  
: Non-verbal emphasis 
… Non-verbal emphasis 
just Adverbial intensifier 
wanted to be nice Non-negative negative 
live a normal life Non-negative negative 
… Non-Verbal emphasis 
But Negation/Opposition 
forcing me Negative Evaluator 
figure out ways to survive Non-negative negative 
… Non-Verbal emphasis 
But Negation/Opposition 
helpless Negative feeling 
anything Adverbial intensifier 
 
2.1.2.1 Process Variables: In the area of violence prediction, the Association of 
Threat Assessment Professionals (ATAP, 2006) lists process variables as threat 
indicators that suggest that a subject is actually approaching an act of violence. 
Variables such as evidence of escalation, attack rehearsal, actual attack 
preparations, and weapon acquisition are included in this category (ATAP, 2006, 
p. 7). The SIRDC includes many of these variables as predictive of increased 
violence risk but also utilizes these process measures more broadly to denote 
other types of insider attack preparations.  For example, a subject in an angry or 
violent state of mind is more likely to act on his rage, but the type of action he 
or she chooses may be better predicted from his or her personality, experience, 
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and access to tools that can facilitate his destructive goals. Subject fantasies 
about insider acts, rehearsal, and feelings that other options are not available also 
carry over from violence to broader insider act predictors on the SIRDC. In 
addition, some extreme states of mind associated with violence also are included 
as broader insider risk predictors, such as suicidal thoughts, a loss of cognitive 
control or inhibitions due to substance abuse or other factors, and 
depersonalization of a potential target, making it easier to attack.   
2.1.2.2 At-Risk Psychological States: The next section of the SIRDC includes 
at-risk psychological states that may not be as extreme as those cited above, but 
that refer to explicit impairments of rational thought that have been associated 
with insider actions. These states of mind include content indicators of:  
 Suspiciousness, 
 Accusations, 
 Victimization, 
 Excessive Blame, 
 Obsession with a potential target or situation; 
 Rationalization of destructive actions, and 
 A range of injustice attributions regarding an organization and/or its 
leadership. 
For example, an individual who is suspicious that he is going to be terminated 
due to some perceived bias against him may manifest suspicion, feelings of 
victimization, blame his supervisor or other coworkers, describe perceived 
injustices he attributes to organizational leaders, and rationalize his actions prior 
to leaving the organization and stealing its intellectual property. 
The passage below was taken from an insider who leaked proprietary 
information from an organization and eventually sought extortion money to 
cease his activities. It would be coded on the SIRDC for examples of injustice 
attributions, suspiciousness, victimization and excessive blame. 
It was not enough for government officials to destroy my 
financial resources; but they also had to destroy my reputation 
and violate my civil rights, including my first amendment rights, 
by threatening those who associated with me. For all I have 
been accused of, I should have been locked away for life.  Where 
was the Justice Department then? Because I have endured 
multiple punishments without ever having any opportunities to 
know what the charges were or even have one proceeding to 
present evidence on my behalf, its payback time.  
2.1.2.3 Personal Predispositions: Personal predispositions are derived from 
previous research on the critical pathway travelled by insiders as they move 
through a series of steps over time within their organization taking them closer 
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to committing sabotage, espionage, IP theft, violence or fraud. This critical 
pathway has been described by Shaw and Fischer (2005); Band and colleagues 
(Band et al., 2006); Shaw, Fischer, and Rose (2009); and Shaw and Stock (2011).  
Personal predispositions describe characteristics and experiences of individuals 
prior to joining their organizations that, in the presence of other precipitants, 
appear to make them more vulnerable to participating in insider violations.  
These personal predispositions include: 
 Serious mental health disorders or medical conditions impacting 
perception, judgment, impulsiveness and decision-making, such as 
alcoholism, attention deficit disorders, anxiety disorders, depression, 
etc. 
 Personality disorders, social skills problems and/or significant biases in 
personal and professional decision-making that consistently negatively 
impact personal and professional relationships producing observable, 
maladaptive personal and professional behaviors. 
 A history of rule violations ranging from such serious conduct as 
prosecuted legal violations and convictions (DWIs) to less serious 
offenses such as chronic tardiness, violations of dress code or hygiene 
regulations, ignoring organizational policies and practices, or other 
violations of organizational protocol. 
 Social network risks, such as a family history of criminal activity or 
membership in an adversary group, or any pre-employment (at location 
from which espionage is committed) contact (face-to-face, telephone or 
digital) with members of an adversarial at-risk group.  
2.1.2.4 Personal Stressors: Within the critical pathway framework, personal 
and professional stressors are seen as activating personal predispositions and 
contributing to an increased likelihood of Concerning Behaviors and insider risk.  
Personal stressors are defined as changes in personal or social responsibilities or 
conditions requiring significant energy for adaptation, which do not involve 
direct workplace or financial issues—including death of a family member, 
marriage, divorce, births, moves, etc. These events or experiences are derived 
from the Holmes-Rahe Scale of stressful life events (Holmes and Rahe, 1967).    
 
2.1.2.5 Professional Stressors: Professional stressors include changes in 
professional, school, and/or work conditions or responsibilities that require 
significant energy for adaptation, exclusive of financial and personal 
implications—changes in affiliation, graduation, attending a new institution or 
obtaining a new job, demotion, termination, promotion, transfer, retirement, 
consulting work, taking side jobs, etc.  The loss or gain of income related to new 
school, job, promotion, or termination is scored separately in financial stressors. 
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In the Manning excerpt above, he references plans for his discharge, being 
demoted from intelligence to supply duties, and his reaction to news coverage of 
his alleged leaks.  Both these negative and “positive” events would be coded as 
professional stressors within this section. 
 
2.1.2.6 Concerning Behaviors: Concerning Behaviors are violations of 
policies, standard procedures, professional conduct, accepted practice, rules, 
regulations, or law through action or inaction (failure to report), which have been 
observed by managers, supervisors,  coworkers, or reported to these individuals 
by others. For example, failure to submit a time sheet in a timely manner, 
unreported travel, misuse of expense accounts, violations of hygiene or dress, 
refusal to follow supervisor instructions, going around a supervisor to a superior, 
coworker or supervisor conflicts, in some settings, filing complaints or protests 
against other employees or supervisors, etc. This category of variables is also 
derived from work on the Critical Pathway to insider risk described above by  
Shaw and Fischer (2005); Band and colleagues (Band et al., 2006); Shaw, 
Fischer, and Rose (2009); and Shaw and Stock (2011). 
 
References to the occurrence of any of the following behaviors or failures to act 
are recorded as concerning behaviors including violation of accepted policies 
and practices governing: 
 Interpersonal conduct; 
 Use of information technology or other technical systems; 
 The protection of sensitive or classified information; 
 Physical security;  
 Financial conduct; 
 Personnel security; 
 Travel rules; and 
 Social network contacts and affiliations. 
References to mental health or addiction problems that could impact judgment 
or behavior are also included in this section. In addition, other categories and 
individual actions may be included tailored to the definition of “concerning” that 
applies to the organization involved. As noted above, there is considerable 
overlap between personal predispositions and concerning behaviors, with the 
only difference in some of these categories consisting of the timing of the 
behavior. Behaviors or experiences noted prior to the subject’s joining the 
organization are categorized as personal predispositions (characteristics he 
brought to the organization), while similar issues noted while on the job are 
considered concerning behaviors. 
Digital references to any of these issues are coded within the Concerning 
Behavior category, including signs of conflict with others across digital media.  
For example, portions of the excerpt below, taken from an insider who sabotaged 
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servers at a financial institution, would be coded for such concerning behaviors 
as interpersonal conflict with a supervisor and failing to follow instructions 
regarding the operation of an information technology resource.  Additional codes 
would include professional stressors for the references to being fired, relieved of 
duty, or quitting. 
Until you fire me or I quit, I have to take orders from you.  I’ll 
sit with K after I’ve written some procedures on what he can do.  
Just like he cannot have LAN supervisor password until he is a 
trained LAN expert, I won’t give him Sybase ROOT access until 
he has been trained to be of some minimal use.  If you order me 
to give him root access, then you have to permanently relieve 
me of any duties on that machine.  I can’t be a garbage cleaner 
if someone screws up. 
Examples of coded material using both the SNIT and the SIRDC are included in 
the Appendix. In the next section the research design used to assess the scales’ 
inter-rater reliability and performance is described. 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The first objective of this research was to assess the inter-rater reliability and 
criterion group validity of the SNIT and SIRDC scales. For this purpose, two 
email samples were selected at random from the full, publically available Enron 
email corpus (http://www.edrm.net/projects/dataset) using Net's Random class 
protocol (http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/system.random.aspx). Three 
coders—a psychiatric nurse and two individuals with master’s degrees in 
Political Psychology, but no advanced threat assessment or clinical 
psychological training—performed the coding.   
SNIT and SIRDC inter-rater reliability was first tested with 75 randomly 
selected emails from the Enron email archive. The SNIT’s initial inter-rater 
reliability as determined by the Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC) (Koch 
& Norman, 1982) which was used due to the presence of continuous versus 
nominal or ordinal data, was .975 (p≤0.05). SIRDC’s initial ICC was .862 
(p≤0.05). A preliminary analysis of the SNIT scale’s subcategories showed that 
four measured overlapping manifestations of negative sentiment and could be 
merged and redefined to improve inter-rater reliability. 
We anticipated that a relatively low proportion of Enron emails would contain 
negative sentiment and insider risk. Therefore, we sought additional subjects 
from criterion groups with known negative sentiment, and in some cases, insider 
actions, to test scale inter-rater reliability as well as scale performance with these 
more expressive and complicated subjects. For this purpose, we collected 
communication samples from the following 13 sources:  
 Ten communications from subjects who subsequently committed insider 
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attacks were randomly selected from the first author’s investigative case 
archive.  These were individuals who expressed themselves online prior 
to or during their insider actions; 
 Thirteen disgruntled employees from the Enron archive who 
complained, but did not subsequently take insider actions according to 
Google searches of their names. These subjects were selected by a visual 
scan of subject headers followed by inspection of the email from the 
original Enron archive; 
 Seventeen time series emails from an online stalker who subsequently 
attacked his target physically, taken from the first author’s case archive.  
These emails were selected to assess scale sensitivity to subject changes 
over time and especially any indication of heightened risk; 
 Five publically available emails from Bruce Ivins, who was implicated 
but never tried in the 2001 Anthrax attacks, taken from a public FBI 
report on the investigation (U.S. Department of Justice [2010] 
Amerithrax Investigative Summary, 
http://www.justice.gov/amerithrax/docs/amx-investigative-
summary.pdf);  
 Ten communications selected by a clinician for representation of 
depressive communication from participants in public but anonymous 
online chat rooms for anxiety and depression 
(http://www.depressionhaven.org/phpBB2/viewtopic.php?t=8397  
(http://www.anxietyzone.com/index.php/board,4.0.html?PHPSESSID=
e9a40ba11ef20150e3649cc1aca3456f);   
 Ten communications selected by a clinician for representation of anger 
from participants in a public but anonymous online chat room for anger 
(http://www.anxietyzone.com/index.php/topic,31323.0.html);  
 Ten communications selected by a clinician for representation of 
financial stress from participants in public but anonymous online chat 
rooms for financial stress 
(http://www.indeed.com/forum/cmp/Target/target-is-bogus/t8403; 
http://www.anxietyzone.com/index.php/topic,51034.0.html;  
http://www.experienceproject.com/stories/Hate-Living-Paycheck-To-
Paycheck/2161275);  
 Ten communications selected by a clinician for representation of suicide 
risk from participants in public but anonymous online chat room for 
suicide risk 
(http://www.yourlifeyourvoice.org/AskIt/Pages/default.aspx);   
 Ten communications selected by a clinician for representation of 
substance abuse from participants in a public but anonymous online chat 
room for substance abuse problems 
(http://www.anxietyzone.com/index.php/board,13.0.html?PHPSESSID
=e9a40ba11ef20150e3649cc1aca3456f);  
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 Ten communications selected by a clinician as representative of 
disgruntled employee communication from participants in public but 
anonymous online chat rooms for disgruntled employees complaining 
about work stress 
(http://www.anxietyzone.com/index.php/topic,51034.0.html  and 
http://www.experienceproject.com/stories/Hate-Living-Paycheck-To-
Paycheck/2161275);    
 The content from an OpEd piece in the Wall Street Journal by Greg 
Smith complaining about the ethical climate at Goldman Sachs as he 
resigned (Smith, 2012),  
 Email communications from alleged US Army leaker Bradley Manning 
with his hacker contact taken from public coverage of the incident 
(Hansen, 2011); and 
 An email from U.S. Navy sailor Paul Hall, who changed his name to 
Hassan Abu-Jihaad, communicating from his destroyer to an established 
website sympathetic to Al Qaeda. Hall was convicted of providing 
material support to terrorists in March 2008 (United States District 
Court, 2009).  
Although other researchers have used similar data to study disgruntled 
populations (Holton, 2009), we were concerned that use of a convenience sample 
of publically posted comments from individuals speaking with potential 
anonymity on self-help chat boards might not generalize to content found in 
organizational email. However, we were anxious to test scale performance with 
self-identified criterion groups with problems known to arise in the workplace.  
Subsequent criterion group materials derived from workplace communications 
might improve the generalizability of this sample. To ameliorate these concerns 
we included actual content from disgruntled Enron employees.  Since discussing 
this dilemma with personnel responsible for monitoring email content at several 
government and commercial organizations, we were assured that employees are 
surprisingly frank in their discussions of personal emotions and life crises and 
that it would not be unusual to discover employee discussions of suicide, 
financial distress, and other serious concerns while searching for references to 
policy or security violations. 
To assess the face and criterion validity of the scales we planned to compare the 
mean results from these established groups with 1000 randomly selected emails 
from the Enron archive with the hypothesis that the criterion groups would score 
significantly higher on both measures. This data set was reduced to 994 emails 
when duplicates were discovered. We did not make predictions regarding the 
relative ranking of groups on the SNIT or the SIRDC scales due to the limited 
nature of the samples and the unknown expressive characteristics of insiders 
versus the other criterion groups. However, we did expect some portion of the 
samples from actual insiders (including Private Manning, Bruce Ivins, Abu 
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Jihaad and the Online Stalker) to score higher on the SIRDC. To address the 
scales’ sensitivity to changes over time we charted the scores of the Online 
Stalker in 17 emails to his intended victim leading up to, and after, his physical 
attack. 
To address the earlier questions regarding the frequency of negative sentiment 
and insider risk indicators in organizational email we calculated the simple 
percentage of subjects expressing a range of these variables. To address the 
question of the proportion of subjects with different ranges of negative sentiment 
that also manifested insider risk indicators, we performed a simple review of the 
percentage of High, Medium and Low SNIT subjects that also manifested scores 
on the SIRDC. To determine the proportion of subjects with different levels of 
insider risk that did or did not also display negative sentiment, we reviewed the 
distribution of SNIT scores among subjects with High and Low SIRDC scores. 
4. RESULTS 
Inter-rater reliability for the SNIT and SIRDC across the randomly selected 
Enron subjects was .919 and .915, respectively. As noted above, this result may 
have been inflated due to the low frequency of subjects manifesting negative 
sentiment and insider risk and the subsequent frequency of zero scores.  
However, we were encouraged that coders could agree on whether these often 
subtle variables were present or absent in this sample. Inter-rater reliability 
across the more complicated criterion groups averaged .969 (p≤0.05) for the 
SNIT scale and .731 (p≤0.05) for the SIRDC scale. 
While inter-rater reliability for the SNIT proved excellent measured against an 
ICC criteria of .70, the performance of the longer and more complicated SIRDC 
was less consistent among coders. Inter-rater reliability scores for four of the 13 
groups performed just below the .70 criteria, indicating the need for further work 
on the SIRDC scales to improve coder reliability. This may also be a product of 
the lower frequency of SIRDC scores in this sample, limiting coder experience 
with the scale. However, the global ICC score of .731 indicated that coder 
reliability overall was acceptable. 
4.1 What is the Frequency of Emails Containing Negative Sentiment in a 
Randomly Selected Sample of Corporate Communication? 
Table 2 below displays the frequency of emails with High, Medium, Low and 
No negative sentiment as measured by the SNIT within the randomly selected 
Enron email sample. 
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Table 2 Distribution of negative sentiment in ENRON Sample of High, 
Medium, Low, and No SNIT score groups 
SNIT Group 
# Emails Per Group 
and Percentage of 
Total 
Mean SNIT 
Score 
High (SNIT Score ≥31) 6 (0.6%) 44.39 
Medium (SNIT Score ≥16 and ≤30) 9 (0.9%) 19.93 
Low (SNIT Score ≥1 and ≤15) 207 (20.82%) 2.56 
No Negative Sentiment 772 (77.67%) 0 
 
Illustrative examples of email excerpts from each category containing negative 
sentiment are displayed in the Appendix.  It was notable that many of the insider 
risk issues captured concerned potential fraud, interpersonal conflict, litigation, 
as well as organizational and interpersonal disgruntlement. As can be seen in 
Table 2, while low levels of negative sentiment were common, moderate and 
high levels were extremely rare in this sample, occurring in less than 1% of 
communications. However, if this finding were extrapolated to the large number 
of emails contained in organizational systems, this rate of discovery would be 
equivalent to finding 6,000 emails high in negative sentiment within a million 
email cache. 
4.2 What is the Frequency of Emails Containing Insider Risk Indicators in 
a Randomly Selected Sample of Corporate Email? 
Table 3 below displays the distribution of insider risk indicators recorded on the 
SIRDC within the randomly selected Enron email. 
Table 3 Distribution of SIRDC Scores in Enron Sample 
Group Number and Percentage 
of Email 
Mean Group SIRDC 
Score 
High SIRDC (≥9) 2 (.2%) 12.3 
Low SIRDC (<9) 34 (3.4%) 1.4 
No SIRDC score 958 (96.4%) 0 
 
Illustrative examples of email excerpts representative of both the High and Low 
SIRDC groups are contained in the Appendix. While almost 22% of sampled 
emails displayed negative sentiment, less than 4% displayed indicators of insider 
risk. Emails containing high levels of insider risk according to the SIRDC 
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comprised less than one percent or the cache. Although just over three percent 
of emails contained low levels of SIRDC scored risk, these scores were 
extremely low, as displayed in Table 3. 
4.3 What Percentage of Emails Containing Negative Sentiment Also 
Contain Some Level of Insider Risk Indicator? 
Table 4 below displays the distribution of insider risk at different levels of 
negative sentiment. Of the 994 emails in the Enron sample, 222 or 22% 
contained some level of negative sentiment according to the SNIT.  Of these 222, 
36 or 16.3% also displayed indicators of insider risk. This finding indicates that 
only a very low percent of emails with negative sentiment also contain indicators 
of insider risk. However, the data in Table 5 also indicates that the odds that an 
email will contain insider risk increase as the level of negative sentiment rises. 
As Table 4 displays, two-thirds of the emails with high levels of negative 
sentiment contained insider risk indicators, while only 13.5% of emails with low 
negative sentiment contained insider risk indicators. However, the distribution 
of insider risk across emails with negative sentiment does not appear to be 
straightforward in this sample. As Table 6 shows, the two emails highest in 
insider risk appeared in the Medium SNIT group. 
 
Table 4 Distribution of Insider Risk across High, Medium, and Low Negative 
Sentiment Groups in the Enron Sample 
SNIT Group 
Number of Emails with SIRDC Scores 
and Percent of Total Emails in Group 
with SIRDC Score 
SNIT High (31 or greater) N=6 4 (all low) 66.6% 
SNIT Medium (16-30) N=9 4 (2 high, 2 low) 44.4% 
SNIT Low (1-15) N=207 28 (all low)13.5% 
All SNIT Emails N=222 36 (16.2% of all emails in sample) 
4.4 What Percentage of Emails Containing Insider Risk Content Also 
Contains Some Level of Negative Sentiment? 
Table 5 below examines the 36 emails from the Enron sample that contained 
either high or low levels of insider risk indicators on the SIRDC to determine 
how many also contained negative sentiment as measured by the SNIT. As the 
table indicates, all of the emails with insider risk also contained negative 
sentiment. As the mean SNIT scores show, the level of negative sentiment was 
higher for the High insider risk group than for the Low risk group. 
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Combined with the data displayed in Table 4, this pattern of results indicates that 
overall, emails with negative sentiment are far less likely to contain insider risk 
indicators, while all emails with insider risk indicators contain negative 
sentiment. In addition, these results indicate that the odds of an email with 
negative sentiment containing insider risk indicators increases with the level of 
negative sentiment and that the level of negative sentiment found in emails with 
insider risk increases as the level of insider risk increases. An important 
implication of this finding is that any approach utilizing negative sentiment alone 
to locate the communications of individuals at-risk for insider actions will be 
handicapped by a very high, built-in, false positive rate. Another finding with 
practical implications is that emails low in negative sentiment contained 
exclusively low levels of insider risk. This finding may help analysts prioritize 
their search for at-risk individuals by avoiding this group. 
 
Table 5 Distribution of SNIT Scores in High and Low SIRDC Groups 
SIRDC Group 
Number of Emails with SNIT 
Scores and (Percent of Emails 
in Group with SNIT Score) 
Mean SNIT 
Scores 
SIRDC High ≥9 N= 2 2 (100%) 26 
SIRDC Low (1-9) N=34 34 (100%) 11.21 
4.5 Do the SNIT and the SIRDC Successfully Differentiate Groups with 
Known Levels of Negative Sentiment and Insider Risk from a Randomly 
Generated Sample of Organizational Email? 
As Tables 6 and 7 indicate, the SNIT and SIRDC scores for the criterion groups 
were significantly different than those for the overall Enron sample. 
4.6 Are the SNIT and SIRDC Sensitive to Changes over Time in an Actual 
Insider as the Risk of Action Moving from Online Harassment to Physical 
Assault Increased? 
Figure 1 depicts changes over time in the SNIT and SIRDC scores of emails 
from an online stalker to his victim. These scores were normalized for number 
of words to control for email length. This harassment turned from hostile and 
threatening communications to an actual assault on the victim’s car just after 
Email 12 but prior to Email 13 (on Valentine’s Day). As can be seen in Figure 
1, the subject’s SNIT and SIRDC scores peaked just prior to the attack and then 
declined immediately afterwards. It was also informative to observe the 
independence of the SNIT and SIRDC at the early stages of the case when the 
communications from the stalker were emotionally distraught but not 
threatening. As his frustration grew, so did the threatening nature of his email 
and thus, his SIRDC score. Table 5 in the Appendix provides illustrative excerpts 
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and SNIT and SIRDC values for the three emails demonstrating the SNIT’s and 
SIRDC’s relative independence (emails 3 and 17) and overlap (email 12). 
Table 6 Mean SNIT Scores by Criterion Groups and Enron Sample 
SNIT Scores for Criterion 
Groups and Enron Sample 
Mean SNIT 
Score 
Standard 
Deviation 
Significance 
Value p≤ 
Depressed Chat Participants 98.23 56.36 .001 
Disgruntled with Job Chat 
Participants 
83.53 51.28 .001 
Disgruntled Enron Employees 
Email 
79.64 44.25 .000 
Angry Chat Participants 69.27 43.01 .001 
Substance Abuse Chat Participants 64.30 38.45 .001 
Suicidal Chat Participants 60.33 26.09 .000 
Ten Actual Insider’s 
correspondence 
47.68 33.37 .002 
Financial Distress Chat 
Participants 
38.77 38.91 .002 
Five Emails from Bruce Ivins 35.87 11.23 .002 
Mean for 17 emails from Online 
Stalker 
28.16 21.22 .000 
Overall Mean for Criterion 
Groups 
60.58 36.42 .000 
Greg Smith Op Ed Attacking 
Goldman Sachs 
163.0 Na Na 
Bradley Manning Disgruntled Chat 
with Hacker 
84.0 Na Na 
Abu Jihaad 68.67 36.02 Na 
Enron 994 .98 .15 Na 
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Table 7 Mean SIRDC Scores by Criterion Groups and Enron Sample 
SIRDC Scores for Criterion Groups and 
Enron Sample 
Mean SIRDC 
Score 
Standard 
Deviation 
Significance 
Value p≤ 
Depressed Chat Participants 25.70 14.14 .000 
Disgruntled with Job Chat Participants 18.33 13.49 .002 
Disgruntled Enron Employees Email 26.79 20.72 .001 
Angry Chat Participants 13.13 8.07 .001 
Substance Abuse Chat Participants 15.67 9.62 .001 
Suicidal Chat Participants 12.67 4.72 .000 
Ten Actual Insider’s correspondence 17.93 15.65 .006 
Financial Distress Chat Participants 7.40 4.69 .001 
Five Emails from Bruce Ivins 17.87 6.78 .004 
17 emails from Online Stalker 14.04 10.74 .000 
Overall Means for Criterion Groups 16.99 7.33 .000 
Greg Smith Op Ed Attacking Goldman Sachs 46 Na  
Bradley Manning Disgruntled Chat with 
Hacker 
34.0 Na   
Abu Jihaad 34.67 30.66  
Enron 994  .07 .55  
 
 
Figure 1 SNIT and SIRDC Levels by Email Number (1-17) 
A
T
T
A
C
K 
Normalized SNIT and SIRDC 
Scores As Online Stalker 
Escalates to Violence 
Physical 
Attack 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
This preliminary research on the SNIT and SIRDC indicated that both scales 
displayed acceptable levels of inter-rater reliability for a randomly selected 
sample of 994 emails from the Enron archive and for a subset of at-risk criterion 
subjects presenting more robust and complex forms of negative sentiment and 
insider risk. The SNIT and SIRDC successfully differentiated communications 
from criterion groups, including subjects self-identified as angry, depressed, 
anxious, suicidal, addicted to substances, disgruntled with their employment, 
struggling with financial stress, and disgruntled Enron employees, from a 
randomly selected group of Enron employee communications. In addition, the 
SNIT and SIRDC also differentiated the 994 Enron controls from the 
communications of ten known insiders, as well as Private Bradley Manning, Dr. 
Bruce Ivins, former Goldman Sachs Director Greg Smith and convicted terrorist 
accomplice, former U.S. Navy sailor Paul Hall (aka Hassan Abu-Jihaad). The 
SNIT and SIRDC also proved sensitive to changes over time in a case of 17 
communications from a jilted online stalker to his former lover, and both SNIT 
and SIRDC scores peaked just prior to this subject escalating from harassing 
communications to a physical attack on the victim’s property. 
This research also examined the distribution of negative sentiment and insider 
risk as measured by the SNIT and SIRDC in a randomly selected sample of 994 
Enron communications and the heretofore unexplored relationship between 
negative sentiment and insider risk. Based on this sample from an organization 
which was suffering significant stress over the time frame examined, negative 
sentiment proved relatively rare, appearing in only 22% of examined emails.   
Moreover, all but 1.5% of these emails containing negative sentiment scored in 
the low range of the SNIT. Less than one percent of these emails contained 
negative sentiment in the high range.   
Communications containing insider risk measured by the SIRDC in this sample 
were even more rare, with only 3.5% of emails registering any SIRDC score. Of 
those 36 emails discovered, only two or 0.2% of the sample, contained high 
levels of SIRDC indicators. The relatively rare occurrence of signs of negative 
sentiment and insider risk indicates the importance of using samples from known 
criterion groups when testing the sensitivity of human or automated systems 
designed to detect negative sentiment or insider risk. Samples from naturally 
occurring email caches are unlikely to contain realistic representations of desired 
target groups and therefore will not test any system’s ability to detect these 
communications. Test samples with only low levels of SNIT or SIRDC 
communications also are unlikely to be representative of real insider 
communications. 
Another important theoretical and practical question examined in this research 
concerned the relationship between negative sentiment and insider risk, 
specifically, how frequently emails with negative sentiment also contain insider 
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risk indicators. This question has significant implications for analysts and 
investigators concerned with insider risk identification and assessment.  In this 
Enron sample, only 16.3% of emails with any level of negative sentiment also 
contained any level of insider risk indicator. While the odds of discovering 
insider risk in emails containing negative sentiment increased with the level of 
negative sentiment, investigators using any level of negative sentiment alone to 
discover communications with insider risk would appear to handicap themselves 
with a significant burden of false positives. However, all of the emails scoring 
in any range of the SIRDC for insider risk contained some level of negative 
sentiment. Another practical finding cited above is that all of the emails with low 
levels of negative sentiment that had SIRDC scores were in the low range.  
Pending some evidence that low insider risk scores escalate over time, 
investigators may want to prioritize their search resources against higher levels 
of negative sentiment.  
This finding indicates that negative sentiment is an integral part of insider risk, 
as would be expected given the high rates of disgruntlement and negative 
psychological states associated with those responsible for insider events. 
However, more complex and sensitive paradigms than negative sentiment alone 
will be required to detect insider risk without the problem of significant numbers 
of false positives.  This challenge will be discussed further in following articles, 
where the concept of perceived Victimization as an insider risk factor is 
examined. 
5.1 Progress toward an At-Risk Insider Target Group 
Further analysis of this data and future research will explore the characteristics 
of negative sentiment associated with insider risk compared to negative 
sentiment in general, as well as the other psycholinguistic markers of insider risk 
that can be identified in digital communications. In the meantime, results of this 
research indicate that communications with moderate-to- high levels of negative 
sentiment are more likely to contain insider risk indicators than communications 
with low levels of negative sentiment.  It appears from a preliminary review of 
our data that these high SNIT and SIRDC scores are capturing many of the 
psychological conditions and manifestations of disgruntlement that have been 
found to contribute to insider risk  (Shaw and Stock, 2011). These at-risk cases 
were easily differentiated from the more general Enron population sample and 
may constitute a readily identifiable at-risk group of extreme interest to 
investigators. These high-to-moderate negative sentiment communications are 
also likely to contain a lower percentage of false positive leads that will 
unnecessarily burden analysts and investigators. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1 
Scale of Negativity In Texts (SNIT) Item Descriptions 
1. Negative Evaluators 
Judgments, beliefs, attributes with negative 
connotations 
2. Negative Feelings Emotions, feelings with negative connotations 
3. Adverbial Intensifiers 
Add emphasis or power to expressedSentiment—
“very,” “so,” “too.” 
4. Non-verbal emphasis 
Add power or emphasis to negative content with 
symbols like !, all caps, underline, numbers,  etc. 
5. Negation or Opposition 
Statements 
Create negativity thru the addition of terms like no, 
not, never, n’t, impossible, or phrases like “over my 
dead body.” 
6. Sarcasm or Negative Irony 
Nice try.  Thanks for sharing. Couldn’t happen to a 
nicer guy.  
7. Rhetorical Question 
How’s that working for you? Did you think before 
you spoke? 
8. A direct accusation, criticism 
or attack toward a specific 
individual or group.  
“You don’t understand how much misery you have 
caused,” “you have ruined our culture,” “I don’t 
know how you can sleep at night keeping your 
millions and leaving thousands without jobs.” 
9. Threats—Direct,  specific and 
indirect general threats that 
may involve violence and  non-
violent coercive threats such as  
lawsuits, leaks, illicit 
communications blackmail or 
other “white collar” non-
violent acts. 
Direct threat— “I’ll get even with you tomorrow,” 
“next time I see you I’m going to rearrange your 
face.” Indirect threat—lack specifics about the 
target, timing or means and are more general in 
nature. For example, “they’ll get what they 
deserve,” “someone will take care of them.” 
Coercive threats—“if you do not comply we will go 
to the press or file suit in court.” 
10. Use of curses, foul language, 
racial, political, religious, 
sexual or other slurs 
Shit, asshole, whore, raghead, kike, Etc. 
11. Dangerous Religious, Political, 
Racial or other Beliefs 
All non-believers are doomed, Mudpeople need to 
be extinguished 
12. Sexual Material 
Score 1 point for inappropriate sexual content and 
additional points for dehumanizing, objectifying 
content 
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13. Provocations, taunts, 
challenges, dares, 
confrontational command to an 
individual or group. 
“bring it,” “I dare you,” “You and what army,” 
“Watch me.” 
14. A Direct personal appeal,  plea,  
or address with negative 
connotation indicating the 
author is uncomfortable, upset 
or anxious 
“listen to me,” “Level with me,” “trust me,” 
“believe me,” “I implore you to consider.” 
15. Direct demand for recompense, 
reparation, justice, or  
conciliatory actions denoting 
the author’s upset and assertive 
or aggressive state 
“after 20 years you owe me,” “who’s going to pay 
for this,” “this is your responsibility to fix,” ”there 
should be an accounting.” 
16. Non-negative statements that 
imply criticism,  negativity, 
protest, opposition or express 
these indirectly  
“good try,” “I was going to ask her out but then she 
left,” “another night the same.” “but I’ve always 
loved you,” “I’ve worked hard all my life,” “I’ve 
done my best for the Company.” 
Total  
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Table 2 
Overt signs of violent, angry or vengeful state of mind—references to anger or 
frustration linked to violence or vengeance through some type of hostile act which 
may involve violence or other insider actions.  “You won’t get away with this,” “You 
will pay,”  “You’ve hurt so many of us—there will be an accounting.” Must have 
direct or strongly implied connection to an insider act ranging from violence to leaks, 
etc. 
Signs of escalation of negative feeling, anger, frustration, desperation across 
communications. Examples might include a communication regarding anger and 
depression which subsequently moves to a threat of harm. There may be rare 
occasions when escalation is apparent within communications. However, this should 
be sufficiently dramatic to assure that this is not just natural venting emerging over 
time within the communication and should include escalation from some type of 
feeling or evaluation to some type of threatened action or fantasy rather than a slightly 
more extreme feeling or criticism.   
Signs of addictive behavior (alcohol, illegal drugs, prescribed medications, sexual 
activity, gambling, media or game addiction, pornography) that may impact 
judgment, motivation, vulnerability to compromise or impulse control. 
Signs of fantasy about negative insider-related acts—“I wish I could put you in my 
place,” “I wonder what it would be like to shut you down,” “I wonder how long you 
would last if the public knew how you really operate.”  
Signs of suicidal or self-destructive thoughts or feelings—references to suicidal 
mood, plans (resignation regarding doom or inevitability of suicide). Pay attention to 
references to aggressive actions that may result in suicide through others such as 
suicide by cop as in the cases of Major Hassan or Sodini (the Pa Gym Killer).  Do not 
code depressive feelings here if they do not include direct references to suicidal 
behavior, plans or fantasies. Code depression in Mental Health issues. 
Signs of Planning of negative insider or related acts—discussion of materials, 
equipment, steps needed, results, etc.  
Rehearsal of negative insider or related acts or negative act practiced, approached, 
or attempted without execution.  For example, a shooter who brings his guns to the 
organization planning to attack or a leaker who copies material but then does not 
attack or send the information.  An insider who rehearsed removing materials from 
work by carrying out similar data or equipment. 
Signs of deterioration in cognitive state, concentration, attention, self-control or 
other mental functions. 
Depersonalization of potential victims or targets—language suggesting 
objectification, dehumanization of persons or groups making it easier to attack or 
betray them. 
Signs of diminishing inhibitions—references to negative behavior indicating an 
increase in lack of judgment, control, vulnerability to impulsive actions versus a 
decline in cognitive functions such as concentration and attention. 
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Signs of perceived inability to pursue other options—references to path being 
blocked, feeling no choice but insider acts. 
Suspicion—the author expresses suspicion regarding others’ negative attitudes or 
behavior toward him or those with whom he identifies without any specific 
accusations, statements of victimization or blame.  “I don’t trust Mike,”  “Watch your 
back around that guy,” “If it walks like a duck, talks like a duck…” 
Accusations—the author identifies a specific individual or group as responsible for 
his own or other identified persons’ mistreatment.  “Jay made very sexist statements 
(about me or our female employees).”  “Mr. Smith you have no idea how much misery 
you have caused employees.” Differs from Injustice Attribution which negatively 
characterizes the organization or leadership for its behavior, policies or practices with 
impact across the organization and its clients/customers, etc. 
The author states that they feel specifically, directly and personally victimized, taken 
advantage of, by persons or groups independent of whether these individuals or 
groups are named.  The passage may be scored for both accusations and victimization 
if the author is specific in describing a direct action against him and an individual or 
group to blame. “Bill’s unfair review has destroyed my chances of promotion this 
year.” Differs from Injustice Attribution which negatively characterizes the 
organization or leadership for its behavior, policies or practices with impact across 
the organization and its clients/customers, etc. rather than a specific accusation of 
victimization. 
Rationalizing or Projective Blame—blame exaggerated or rationalized without 
probable foundation to make the author feel better. Beyond a specific complaint the 
author describes an individual or group as responsible for a global set of problems he 
has encountered over time, reflecting an effort to externalize responsibility.  “My 
supervisor ruined my life and destroyed my marriage.”  “You laying me off lead to 
the death of my son.”  “Your negative review two years ago ruined my entire career.” 
General Injustice Attributions—Rather than a specific complaint about an 
individual or group’s actions, injustice attributions impacting specific individuals or 
groups reflect systemic problems with organizational procedures, values, enforcement 
or leadership through specific actions or inactions. They involve specific reports of 
events, procedures, actions or inactions that are reflective or organizational or 
leadership problems rather than individual or small group behaviors.  They differ from 
Professional stressors or general unfairness at work. Includes specific complaints 
about unjust decisions resulting from organizational leadership, policies or practices 
impacting employees beyond the author (but may include him). Examples can include 
a failure to respond to complaints or take action regarding a complaint. In other 
examples, the Subject may believe: 
 wrongful behavior and unfair advantages or connections are systematically 
rewarded (managers selling stock ahead of bad news);  
 lack of work is rewarded while hard work is not.  
 There is unequal versus equal treatment of employees.  
 There is equal or nondiscriminatory treatment when it should be 
individualized and different.  
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 Good behavior or innocence is punished,  
 Punishment is displaced onto persons who either do not deserve it or do not 
deserve the severity of the punishment.   
 The punishment is disproportionate to the act or intent.  
 Wrongful behavior goes unpunished and management makes arbitrary 
rules.  
Signs subject is obsessed with situation as manifested in repeated references or 
complaints about the issue within or across communications, statements that the 
subjects is constantly monitoring the situation, or primed to react to related events.  
Signs of rationale for insider action or activity—“Everyone else is doing it,” “I was 
instrumental in creating this information,” “It can’t be traced back to me,” “It makes 
my life easier not to have to recreate this at my next job,” “They have it coming.” 
“The organization is powerless to protect its interests and assets and therefore 
deserves to be taken advantage of.” 
Signs of mental health problems—include overt references to serious levels of 
depression, anxiety or other mental health disorders or references to treatment, 
referral for evaluation or other indicators of the existence of a mental health problem. 
Do not infer the existence of a diagnosable mental health problem from implied or 
direct references to less serious feelings or states. References to suicidal ideation, 
plans, or attempts may also be coded.  
Signs of personality issues associated with negative Actions (lack of conscience, 
narcissism, psychopathy, social isolation or avoidance, entitlement, impulsiveness, 
difficulties getting along with others, etc.) 
References to previous violations of policies, practices, laws, accepted procedures. 
References to social network risks in the form of contact, communication with or 
relationship with persons and/or groups associated with adverse or competitive 
intentions or actions against organization or personnel. References to family 
members, social contacts or others involved in adversarial, illegal or anti-social acts. 
Section 4. References to personal stressors directly impacting the author—do not 
infer that something was stressful.  Code specific references to events, circumstances 
or perceived situations generally identified as stressful (death of spouse, new job, 
move, divorce, break-up, etc.) or identified by the author as perceived so. 
Section 5. References to professional stressors directly impacting the author—
do not infer that something was stressful. Code specific references to events, 
circumstances or perceived situations identified as professionally stressful by the 
author or generally accepted as stressful –failure to get a raise, promotion, a transfer, 
demotion, layoffs at work, cuts in hours, benefits, etc. 
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Section 6. Concerning Behaviors 
References to Concerning Behaviors—recent violations of policy, practice, law, 
Ethics, standards of interpersonal behavior, information security, finances, personnel 
security, etc. while in current or past position.  Different from previous violations 
which occurred before recent employment.  DWI as young adult might be Previous 
Violation under personal predispositions while a recent DWI would be scored as a 
Concerning Behavior. 
References to unusual travel  that could involve contacts with adversaries 
Section 7. Inhibiting or Mitigating Factors (score negative points for each item, 
subtracted from Insider risk score) 
References to inhibiting religious or ethical beliefs or optimistic attitudes that could 
inhibit insider actions.  “I am young enough to start over.” “I’d love to get even but 
that would mean being as nasty as he was.” 
References to social support, dependents who could be  impacted or act as inhibitors 
of negative actions 
References to successful treatment, counseling or other Inhibiting services or assets 
(legal, financial, social) 
References to concerns about possible insider action on career, reputation, effects 
on others 
References to use of sanctioned channels for complaint, protest such as a letter to 
the CEO, writing a complaint within channels, filing a lawsuit, complaining to HR, 
etc.  
Qualitative Adjustment for Insider Risk in Author Not Captured Above—if you 
feel that some aspect of the ratings do not capture the true level of insider risk 
expressed in this author, add 1-10 points, with an explanation.  For example, is the 
author’s language intensely threatening within a very short passage. Or, does the 
author go on producing a lengthy list of complaints that are not fully captured. 
Alternatively, does the author’s score on one versus other categories raise significant 
concerns, such as the presence of a significant mental health disorder (Paranoid 
Schizophrenia with command hallucinations, Anti-social personality but without 
known concerning behaviors or past offenses mentioned). 
 
For complete copies of the SNIT and SIRDC as well as instructions, contact the 
corresponding author. 
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Table 3 Examples of High, Medium and Low Enron SNIT email excerpts by 
score 
Goup Email 
SNIT 
Score 
Email Excerpt 
High 
(>30) 
42.3 
 
36.0 
 
32.3 
 
“I’m so sad!!! I’m so depressed about the whole thing…He 
feels like the bad guy. And I feel like a bad father!!!” 
“Girl, remind me, just in case I have a memory lapse that I will 
never, ever go back over to that church again…they’re fools… 
I was so embarrassed that my chuckle came out!” 
“Damnit Jeff. I don’t have time!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! The Panic is my 
waste of time trying to get things organized. That’s the 
panic…” 
Medium 
(16-30) 
30.0 
 
 
 
 
23.0 
 
 
 
 
16.0 
“Diomedes is going to jump all over me for even sending the 
ESA memo to Metts. I told him that this message affects more 
than us and he thinks he has free reign within this region… We 
don’t want to come off looking dishonest to our own people. 
And believe me, the rumors are out there… We would be 
talking about half the international people that there is no 
future for them. Whew!”  
“No one seems sure if Bill is the acting originator for this 
contract or not… Also I would appreciate receiving 
clarification of why we don’t define the purchase amount as 
the total and not just the balance remaining. It could create 
discrepancies in the document… this seems inconsistent to 
me… How is this possible?” 
“Brad, I really don’t know where to begin other than just to 
say it. Enron is having some extremely difficult times now… 
this is not a good time for you or anyone else to try and seek 
employment here. I am sorry if I’m letting you down. I was only 
wanting to help. I will always keep you in mind, and hopefully 
when things turn around here, I will be able to address you 
coming here.”  
Low (1-
15) 
11.7 
 
1.7 
 
 
“I wanted to call you at home, but I am never really sure when 
you are sleeping and I don’t want to call and wake you up. 
“As I see it, we really have not choice but to join this system if 
we are going to participate in the JDG. Shortly they will stop 
circulating work product, etc. via email and will rely upon this 
website instead. The costs are somewhat unclear but it is 
intended to be an economy of scale cost sharing concept.” 
 
Table 4 Examples of High and Low SIRDC emails 
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Group 
SIRDC 
Score 
Email Excerpt 
High 
(≥9) 
12.3 “Enron and you made millions out of the pocketbooks of 
California’s consumers and from the efforts of your 
employees… while you netted well over a $100 million, many of 
Enron’s employees were financially devastated when the 
company declared bankruptcy and then retirement plans were 
wiped out… As a result, there are thousands of consumers who 
are unable to pay their basic energy bills and the largest utility 
in the state is bankrupt. The NY Times reported that you sold 
$100 million worth of Enron stock while aggressively urging the 
company’s employees to keep buying it. Please donate this 
money to the funds set up to help repair the lives of those 
Americans hurt by Enron’s under handed dealings.” 
Low 
(<9) 
6.7 
 
 
 
 
4.7 
 
 
2.7 
“Diomedes is going to jump all over me for even sending the 
ESA memo to Metts. I told him that this message affects more 
than us and he thinks he has free reign within this region… We 
don’t want to come off looking dishonest to our own people. And 
believe me, the rumors are out there… We would be talking 
about half the international people that there is no future for 
them. Whew!” 
“Yes, unfortunately, we aren’t going to get ours until the 5th. No 
explanation was given. We may get the numbers a day or so 
ahead of time but I haven’t gotten them yet.” 
”I question whether we should ask Capt. Sawant to put anything 
in writing concerning how to beef up his second report until we 
talk further… I am concerned that anything he puts in writing 
may be discoverable in a U.K. arbitration proceeding....” 
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Table 5 Stalker email excerpts by SNIT and SIRDC scores 
Email # Email Excerpt 
SNIT 
Scores 
SIRDC 
Score 
Email 3 
Who would ever be attracted to you. And you 
think you are going to get a banker.  All you are 
going to get is an asshole who will treat you like 
the ugly slut that you are.  And the funny thing 
is that you probably think you're cute. Well 
honey, you're far far from it.   
32.4 8.7 
Email 12 (Just 
prior to attack) 
No, we did not forget about you.  You are next 
bitch! 
51.5 44.5 
Email 17 
From one bitch to another, you can wear all the 
black pants and black outfits that you want, it 
still doesn't hide your fat ass… nothing can hide 
the fact that you have absolutely NO tits… And 
please, don't ever decide to have children.   
37.3 16.5 
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